How Do Iranian Newspapers View the Anticipated Israeli Response to Tehran?
This week, Iranian newspapers dedicated some of their pages to exploring the expected Israeli response to Tehran following an Iranian missile attack at the end of last month that targeted Israeli sites within Palestinian territories. This attack was in retaliation for the assassination of the former Secretary-General of Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hassan Nasrallah, who was supported by Iran, along with Iranian military leaders in Beirut, and for the assassination of the head of Hamas’s political bureau, Ismail Haniyeh, in Tehran, according to statements following the Iranian strike.
The newspaper Javan stated that Iran has three options if it is attacked by Israel. The first is to free itself from any constraints regarding its nuclear program and to operate as it sees fit, away from the international commitments made to the International Atomic Energy Agency.
The second option involves creating a global oil crisis by disrupting international navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. The newspaper’s third suggestion is to strike important sites and infrastructure in Israel, which would disrupt normal life in Israeli cities.
In a related context, political analyst Mohammad Bour Gholami noted that the Iranian regime, as the leader of the “Axis of Resistance,” relies on strategic pillars and bases, the most important of which is to avoid initiating direct war as much as possible. He considers this a strategic priority for Iran given the current circumstances and complexities.
Analysis of Iranian Perspectives on the Expected Israeli Response
The Iranian writer emphasized the need for Iran to continuously increase pressure on Israel by arming and equipping the Axis of Resistance. One of the pillars that Iran should focus on, according to the Iranian writer, is to undermine Israel’s security by preventing settlers from returning to their homes in the north and creating “rings of fire” around Israel. This strategy aims to eventually lead to the “collapse of the Israeli regime” from within and to expand protests and unrest.
In a related context, former Iranian diplomat Abdolreza Faraji Rad ruled out the possibility of a full-scale war in the region in an interview with the newspaper Tejarat, considering the current developments to be controlled between the parties and not trending toward significant escalation. Faraji Rad added that the United States does not want a comprehensive conflict in the region and that Israel has somewhat been calmed, as a war would not benefit the American Democrats and would impact the energy market.
The writer continued: “Initially, we saw the United States express its opposition to the Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear sites, and then it announced its opposition to the attack on Iranian oil facilities as well. The outcome of talks between the U.S. and Israel shows that the U.S. has succeeded in controlling Tel Aviv and calming its reactions, which has led the Israelis to declare that their attack will not result in a full-scale war.”
Faraji Rad stressed that the visit of the Iranian Foreign Minister to Lebanon carried messages of absolute support for Hezbollah and highlighted the importance of Tehran consulting with Lebanese political authorities as a diplomatic necessity in the current situation.
International affairs analyst Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh noted that Israel aims to respond to Iran through actions that fulfill most of its wartime propaganda goals, ruling out Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu entering a war with Iran before addressing his security concerns in Lebanon.
In an article for the reformist newspaper Arman Melli, Falahatpisheh added that Netanyahu is seeking a symbolic action in Iran that could have significant media and propaganda repercussions. He suggested that Israel might strike a series of oil storage tanks to present the attack as extensive. The writer pointed out that Netanyahu has several concerns, the first being Iran’s potential response, as Iran would utilize all means of comprehensive warfare, including attacks on various areas in Israel with high-destruction capacity missiles. Netanyahu hopes to drag the West into a war with Iran, while the West is not prepared for such a conflict due to its extensive interests and bases in the region being within Iran’s reach.
According to Falahatpisheh, although the resistance factions have suffered severe blows, the outbreak of war with Iran would mean revitalizing all resistance factions and reorganizing them. He concluded that Iran’s reaction would depend on the nature of Israeli actions; if the Israeli operations create a psychological state of war among the people, such as attacks on refineries and energy centers, Iran will initiate war. However, if the actions are against military targets or are limited, the war will be contained to some extent.
New York Times Report on Potential Israeli Attack on Iranian Nuclear Facilities
The New York Times discussed the possibility of Israel launching an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities in a detailed report, analyzing the implications of such an action.
The report began by referencing an Israeli air maneuver that took place two years ago, stating: “Two years ago, dozens of Israeli fighter jets flew over the Mediterranean and simulated an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities.” This operation was publicly referred to by the Israeli Defense Forces as a “long-range flight, aerial refueling, and attack on distant targets.”
According to The New York Times, “the purpose of these exercises was not merely to intimidate the Iranians. The program was also designed to send a message to the Biden administration: the Israeli Air Force is training to carry out the operation independently. Naturally, if the United States, with its 30,000-pound arsenal, joined such an attack, the chances of success would be significantly higher.”
The report noted that current and former senior Israeli officials expressed doubts in interviews about whether the country has the capability to inflict substantial damage on Iranian nuclear facilities. However, in recent days, Pentagon officials have quietly wondered if the Israelis have decided they may not get another chance and are preparing to act independently.
President Joe Biden warned Israel against attacking Iranian nuclear sites or power plants, stating that any response should be “proportional” to the attack launched by the Islamic Republic on Israel the previous week. U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin clearly told his Israeli counterpart, Yoav Gallant, that the United States wants Israel to avoid retaliatory actions that would escalate tensions with the Islamic Republic.
Gallant is scheduled to meet with Austin on Wednesday in Washington.
The New York Times quoted U.S. officials saying: “Israel’s first retaliatory action against the missile attacks launched by the Islamic Republic last Tuesday is likely to involve attacking military bases and perhaps some intelligence or command sites of the Islamic Republic. Initially, it seems unlikely that Israel would target Iranian nuclear facilities.”
According to the report, if the Islamic Republic responds to Israeli attacks, the nuclear facilities would also likely be targeted.
The Times continued: “However, there is a growing desire within Israel, echoed by some in the United States, to seize this opportunity to roll back the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program, as experts and U.S. officials state that Tehran is on the verge of producing a nuclear bomb.”
The report noted: “Despite the common belief that the Islamic Republic can enrich uranium necessary to create a nuclear weapon in just a few weeks, the reality is that to convert this enriched uranium into a deployable weapon, Iranian engineers ‘require months, perhaps more than a year.'”
Former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, a far-right nationalist, recently stated on social media platform X: “Israel now has its greatest opportunity in the past fifty years to change the face of the Middle East. We must act now to destroy the Iranian nuclear program and power plants and incapacitate this terrorist regime effectively and fatally.”
He added, “We have the reasons and the necessary tools. Now that Hezbollah and Hamas have been incapacitated, Iran is more vulnerable than ever.”
According to The New York Times, U.S. officials, along with Joe Biden, have launched a campaign to prevent such attacks, stating that these actions are unlikely to be effective and could plunge the region into a wide-ranging war.
New York Times Report on the Issue of Attacking Iran
In the U.S., the question of how to attack Iran has become an electoral issue. Former President Donald Trump stated that Israel should “hit the nuclear facilities first and then move on to other targets,” although he himself avoided such action during his presidency.
On Sunday, Michael R. Turner, chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, criticized Joe Biden, stating: “It is utterly irresponsible for the president to say that attacking nuclear facilities is not an option on the table, while he previously said otherwise.”
According to The New York Times, “the debate over attacking the nuclear facilities raises new questions: If Israel were to launch an attack, how much could it disrupt Iran’s nuclear capabilities? Would the only result of such an attack be for the Islamic Republic to continue its nuclear program underground and impose a complete ban on the few International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors who still have limited access to key nuclear sites? Would an Israeli attack force Islamic Republic leaders to finally accelerate their bomb-making efforts and cross the line they have not crossed in 25 years?”
Natanz: An Old and New Target
The Natanz enrichment facility has been a focal point for both Israel and the U.S. for the past 22 years. The New York Times reported that Israel has plans to destroy or disrupt the vast complex housing the centrifuges.
The Islamic Republic has repeatedly denied attempts to manufacture nuclear weapons, with Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader, issuing a fatwa in 2003 prohibiting the possession of nuclear weapons. However, some government officials have recently raised questions about whether this fatwa should be lifted.
At the same time, the Islamic Republic has increased its production of uranium enriched to a purity of up to 60%. Experts believe that Tehran now has enough fuel to make three or four bombs, and it would only take a few days to reach the 90% uranium concentration required for a nuclear weapon.
The New York Times continued: “While striking Natanz may be relatively easy, doing so would be considered an act of war. For this reason, the United States has called for diplomacy, sabotage, and sanctions, not bombing, over the past fifteen years. The U.S. has effectively prevented Israel from obtaining the necessary weapons to destroy Fordow, another Iranian enrichment facility built deep within the mountains.”
Former President George W. Bush refused Israel’s request for the largest U.S. bunker-busting bombs and B-2 bombers needed to carry them. These weapons are essential for any attempt to destroy Fordow and other deeply buried facilities.
The New York Times reported that Bush’s decision at the time sparked controversy within the White House. Vice President Dick Cheney supported the idea of an attack, but Bush opposed it, believing that the U.S. could not risk another war in the Middle East.
Ehud Barak, former Prime Minister of Israel, stated in an interview with The New York Times in 2019 that Israel did not have an operational plan to attack Iran until late 2008, which is why Bush’s warnings and opposition did not affect Israel’s approach.
According to The New York Times, “the debate over bunker-busting bombs soon gave way to a major covert operation known as ‘Olympic Games.’ This operation was a highly secretive U.S.-Israeli program aimed at destroying centrifuges using cyber weapons. In this operation, more than 1,000 centrifuges were destroyed by what is known as the Stuxnet virus, delaying the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program by several years or more.”
The Times continued: “However, the ‘Olympic Games’ operation did not completely stop the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program. Iran rebuilt its centrifuges and added thousands more, moving much of its activity underground. Israel also assassinated nuclear scientists and attacked enrichment facilities on the ground, using drones to target centrifuge production sites, and ‘spent massive resources preparing for a potential attack on these facilities.'”
According to the newspaper, “Israel’s efforts in this area waned after the Obama administration reached a nuclear deal with the Islamic Republic, which led the country to send most of its nuclear fuel abroad. Later, when Trump withdrew from this deal, Netanyahu was convinced that the Islamic Republic would abandon its plans in the face of U.S. threats. Instead, Israel focused on Hezbollah and the tunnels where the group stored Iranian-made rockets.”
The New York Times quoted Israeli officials, adding: “When Naftali Bennett became prime minister in 2021, he was shocked by Israel’s lack of readiness to attack the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program and ordered new drills to simulate a long flight to Iran, with new resources allocated for this task.”
The Times reported: “To this day, Israel’s capabilities remain limited. The country relies on an aging fleet of Boeing 707s for aerial refueling, and it will take years to receive newer models from the U.S. that would enable its fighters to travel extremely long distances.”
According to The New York Times, “Israeli munitions have been effective in destroying various tunnels where Hezbollah stores rockets, enabling the killing of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, but Israel simply cannot destroy a heavily fortified nuclear facility built in the heart of the mountains.”
General Frank McKenzie, who was responsible for Iranian war programs when he led U.S. Central Command, stated: “The nuclear target is extremely difficult. There are many other options, many of which would be easier to attack, including energy infrastructure.”
Iran’s Next Steps
The New York Times wrote at the end of its report: “Whether Israel attacks Iranian nuclear facilities or not, there are new reasons for concern about the future of Iran’s nuclear program.”
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has repeatedly stated in recent weeks that Russia is sharing nuclear technology with the Islamic Republic. U.S. officials describe this assistance as “technical help” and assert that there is no evidence that Russia has provided the Islamic Republic with the equipment needed to manufacture a warhead.
Until the attack on Ukraine, Russia cooperated with the U.S. and Europe in curbing the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program and even joined negotiations in 2015 alongside Western nations. Now, if U.S. reports are accurate, Russia’s need for Iranian drones and other weapons could accelerate Tehran’s progress toward manufacturing a nuclear bomb.
According to the New York Times, “the second concern is that the damage inflicted on Hezbollah in recent weeks, including the killing of a significant part of its leadership, could make the Islamic Republic feel vulnerable and no longer able to control the terrorists’ capacity to attack Israel.” Thus, the move to acquire nuclear weapons may be the only true means for the Islamic Republic to deter Israel.
The third concern, according to the paper, is that “striking the Iranian nuclear program will become more difficult because Iran has been digging an extensive network of tunnels in southern Natanz for several years under the watch of American and Israeli satellites.”
The Energy Sector in Iran Under Threat from Israeli Attacks
As the severe energy crisis in Iran escalates, reports suggest that a potential Israeli response may focus on oil refineries and export terminals. If this occurs, the struggling energy sector in the country could turn into a permanent disaster, further complicating the economic and political situation in Tehran.
Iran faced an electricity deficit of 20,000 megawatts this summer, equivalent to 25% of the total electricity demand in the country. It also experienced a gas shortage, unlike previous years, alongside the electricity deficit. As a result, the consumption of fuel oil (mazut) in Iranian power plants doubled, and diesel consumption increased by 80%.
These two polluting fuels constituted 15% of the total fuel supplies for power plants. As autumn began, this percentage rose to 25%, and it is expected that half of the fuel used in power plants this winter will come from fuel oil and diesel, necessitating a consumption of 150 million liters of liquid fuel daily in this sector.
At the same time, data from the Ministry of Oil shows that the country’s reserves of diesel and fuel oil amount to about 1.5 billion liters. Even if industries or land and maritime transport are not supplied with diesel or fuel oil, this quantity would only be sufficient to generate electricity for 10 days.
In recent years, Iran has faced an increasing gasoline crisis, with daily consumption averaging 124 million liters (approximately 33 million gallons).
The severe shortage of natural gas this winter is expected to stop the supply of 20 million cubic meters of compressed gas daily, pushing gasoline consumption to nearly 140 million liters. However, data from the Ministry of Oil indicates that the strategic gasoline reserves in the country barely reach one billion liters, enough to cover local demand for only one week.
If Israel were to target just two of Iran’s refineries, such as the Persian Gulf Star Refinery and the Abadan Refinery, Tehran would lose 30% of its liquid fuel production capacity, equivalent to 800,000 barrels per day.
A quarter of the government budget is allocated for subsidies, ranging from monthly cash assistance to heavy support for fuel, bread, and other essential goods; these subsidies are primarily financed through the sale of petroleum products domestically and internationally.
According to the Iranian Audit Court, the government borrowed 800 trillion rials (approximately $1.3 billion) in the first five months of the current fiscal year (which began on March 20) to cover subsidies, an amount that represents a quarter of the total expenses for these subsidies.
This borrowing is due to the sharp decline in petroleum product exports, resulting from the significant increase in demand for fuel oil and diesel from power plants due to the natural gas shortage, which has led to a substantial reduction in the financial resources allocated for subsidies.
Half of Iran’s population lives in poverty, relying on government assistance for their livelihoods. If the country’s refineries were attacked, the government would practically be unable to continue providing subsidies to the people.
Iran is already facing an inflation rate exceeding 40%, and the elimination of subsidies along with rising fuel prices would lead to hyperinflation.
Due to Electricity Shortages
This summer, electricity shortages led to a sharp decline in steel production and exports in Iran, which account for 16% of the country’s non-oil exports. The production of petrochemical products, which make up 30% of non-oil exports, is also expected to decrease significantly this winter due to a severe gas shortage.
It is anticipated that Iran will face a gas shortfall of 250 million cubic meters daily this winter, equivalent to 25% of the country’s total gas demand. If oil refineries are attacked, the government may lose its ability to supply power plants with fuel, exacerbating the energy crisis.
The revenues from crude oil would also be significantly impacted if Iran’s production infrastructure were to come under attack. Despite a significant increase in Iranian oil exports, only 74% of the revenue target set by the government was achieved in the first five months of the current fiscal year. Additionally, if the Khark oil terminal were targeted, Iran could lose 90% of its oil export capacity.
Last year, Iran’s oil and petroleum product exports totaled $36 billion, equivalent to 8% of the country’s GDP and nine months of the government’s budget.
Sudden Changes in Gasoline Supply
In related news, Iran’s gasoline supply has undergone sudden changes, with new restrictions imposed on fuel distribution and quotas allocated to stations, raising widespread concerns about potential price increases.
In a surprising move, the government, which controls the fuel sector, announced on Sunday new restrictions for vehicle owners. Under these changes, they can now refuel “only twice a day,” with a maximum of 50 liters each time.
These new restrictions will reduce the previous refueling limit from 60 liters to 50. While the monthly quota remains unchanged at 300 liters, officials did not provide any explanation or reason for this daily reduction, raising public and media concern.
According to a plan announced in 2023, about 70% of citizens can receive 30 liters of gasoline for refueling in small towns and 40 liters in larger cities.
Losing refineries like the Persian Gulf Star or Abadan would result in a 30% loss of fuel production in Iran, further intensifying the shortage. Additionally, a single strike on the Khark oil terminal could cut Iran’s oil export capacity by 90%, delivering a severe blow to an already struggling economy.
The loss of refining capacity or further reductions in fuel supplies could push the country towards hyperinflation, increasing poverty rates amid inflation already exceeding 40%.
Techniques for Smuggling Iranian Oil
A new report from The Times reveals details about Iranian oil smuggling operations to China through a “shadow fleet,” which employs advanced techniques to evade international sanctions, amid increasing incidents of oil spills.
An oil spill resulting from an illegal transfer between two ships highlights some of the smuggling operations conducted by Iran through this so-called “shadow fleet.” The vessel “Fortune Galaxy,” which is under international sanctions and known for smuggling Iranian oil, transferred oil to the ship “Syrano 2” in the Gulf. According to the report, this risky transfer ended with an oil spill that spread over an area of 5 kilometers.
This spill is part of a series of incidents linked to the “shadow fleet,” which comprises a group of older ships operating outside maritime law to transport oil from Iran and Russia, avoiding international sanctions by turning off tracking devices and frequently changing their identities.
Oil Spillage and Iranian Oil Smuggling Operations
The oil spill was discovered by TankerTrackers, a company specializing in tracking and monitoring oil tanker movements worldwide. This incident occurred at a critical time, as Iranian oil tankers hastened to leave their ports amid fears of Israeli strikes on Iranian oil facilities—concerns that have contributed to rising global oil prices.
Despite international sanctions that prevent Iran from trading with many countries, China remains one of the largest buyers of Iranian oil, accounting for 15% of its total imports. Iran’s profits from these exports are estimated to exceed $2 billion monthly. However, delivering these oil shipments to China requires circumventing Western sanctions, which is where the “shadow fleet” plays a role.
Daniel Roth, research director at United Against Nuclear Iran, states that Tehran “relies almost entirely on a fleet of 400 tankers that operate illegally to smuggle oil.” He noted that this fleet “has helped Iran avoid losses estimated at over $100 billion in recent years,” according to The Times.
This fleet employs various techniques to evade sanctions, including changing ship flags, forging shipping documents, and transferring oil between ships at sea.
Samir Madani, founder of TankerTrackers, explained that oil spills from these vessels have become more common, especially in regions like the Middle East and Southeast Asia, where “some local authorities turn a blind eye to these incidents or merely document them without taking strict action.”
The U.S. Treasury Department announced last month that it had imposed sanctions on over 12 entities and ships for their involvement in shipping Iranian crude oil and liquefied natural gas to Syria and East Asia on behalf of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Lebanese Hezbollah group.
According to the statement, four ships linked to the fleet of Abdul Jalil Al-Mulah, a Syrian shipping tycoon sanctioned by the U.S. in 2021, and his brother Louay Al-Mulah, were among those affected by the sanctions, as reported by Reuters.
Bradley Smith, Acting Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, stated, “Iran continues to heavily rely on the illicit sale of oil and liquefied natural gas by the IRGC and Hezbollah to finance its terrorist proxies and destabilizing activities.”
Arab Updates
Sudan: New Advances for the Army Forces
The joint force allied with the Sudanese army has taken control of the New Sil area, previously used as a fortified site for storing military equipment and supplies.
A statement from the joint force confirmed that they seized a weapons and ammunition depot, a large truck loaded with food supplies, and two vehicles carrying military equipment, while destroying four combat vehicles belonging to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
The statement indicated that the joint forces pursued what they termed “RSF militia” to the outskirts of Umm Marahik after clearing the northern areas.
In a related context, Mohammed Zakaria, the official spokesperson for the Justice and Equality Movement, announced that the army and the incoming joint force from the north met with the army and joint force in El Fasher.
Meanwhile, the RSF conducted a series of arrests on Sunday, detaining dozens in the city of Kautum and the Kassab IDP camp in North Darfur. They restricted the movement of displaced persons, preventing them from leaving the camp, and banned the use of “Starlink” satellite internet devices, according to Sudan Tribune.
These violations by the RSF against civilians in Kautum follow violent military confrontations between the joint forces allied with the Sudanese army and the RSF over the past weekend in areas such as Bir Mazza and Braidik, and other towns near Kautum.
The RSF has maintained control over the entire Kautum locality in the northwestern part of El Fasher since the early days of the war.
The Sudanese army announced it had regained control over the Jabal Muya area in the Sennar state after fierce battles that lasted several days. The Sovereignty Council stated that Lieutenant General Shams El-Din Kabbashi, Deputy Commander of the Armed Forces, oversaw the operations there.
Sudanese media sources reported that forces from the Sennar army joined others from the White Nile state after declaring the defeat of RSF forces in the Jabal Muya area, which is linked by a main road to the cities of Rabak and Kosti in the White Nile state. This move aims to reconnect these areas that had been nearly besieged due to RSF control.
The RSF had captured Jabal Muya in late June, cutting supply routes to the White Nile, Kordofan, and Darfur states. They then seized most cities in Sennar state, including its capital, Singa.
Political Developments
The Civil Democratic Forces Coordination in Sudan (Taqaddum) reaffirmed its stance on the war, calling on both fighting parties to exercise reason and respond to calls for a ceasefire and seek a peaceful resolution. They condemned the atrocities committed against civilians, particularly killings, looting, artillery shelling, and airstrikes.
Jabal Muya holds strategic importance due to its geographical location connecting Sennar and the White Nile states, making it a site for numerous military operations. Reports indicate that airstrikes played a crucial role in neutralizing RSF artillery, facilitating the advance of the armed forces.
In recent days, intense clashes occurred between the Sudanese army and the RSF, with the armed forces regaining control over most of the area, forcing RSF units to retreat to surrounding villages fortified with mines and artillery.
Despite this progress, cities like Singa and Dinder remain under RSF control since June, and military operations continue with the aim of regaining full control of Sennar state, as the Transitional Sovereignty Council announced the reopening of the road linking Sennar and Rabak.
Military expert Taha Mohamed Ismail stated that liberating Jabal Muya would isolate RSF forces deployed in cities such as Singa, Al-Suki, Dinder, and Abu Hajar. He noted that this “military development puts the RSF in a ‘vice’ between the 4th Division of the army to the east in Blue Nile and the 17th Division in Sennar to the west, with no option but to flee or surrender to army units after their supply lines have been cut.”
Security and military expert Salem Abdullah believes that liberating Jabal Muya has both military and economic implications, as it will facilitate the movement of goods from Port Sudan to the White Nile in central Sudan, to Blue Nile in the southeast, and westward to Kordofan and Darfur states. This could lead to an abundance of goods and a decrease in prices, which have skyrocketed due to scarcity.
Since mid-April 2023, Sudan has been engulfed in war between the Sudanese army and the RSF, resulting in around 21,000 deaths and displacing 10 million people, according to the United Nations.
Kais Saied Closes the Chapter on Elections in Tunisia with an Astounding Victory
The Independent High Authority for Elections in Tunisia announced on Monday that Kais Saied, who has held power in the country since 2021, won a second term with 90.7% of the votes in a presidential election that lacked real competition.
On Monday, Farouk Bouasker, head of the authority, stated at a press conference announcing the preliminary official results that Saied received 2,389,954 votes out of a total of 2,808,545 voters, giving him 90.69% of the votes. His imprisoned opponent, Ayachi Zemali, received 197,000 votes (7.35%), while former deputy Zouheir Maghzaoui got 52,000 votes (1.97%).
The voter turnout was 28.8%, the lowest since the revolution that overthrew Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in 2011. On Sunday, Tunisians cast their votes to elect a new president among three candidates, led by the outgoing president, Kais Saied, who is accused of “drifting towards dictatorship.”
Background on Saied’s Rise to Power
Before taking office in 2019, Saied stated in interviews with Tunisian media, “I do not sell illusions to the Tunisian people. My program is clear: the people are the source of authority, and the constitution should be foundational. There is no such thing as a civil or religious state.” He claimed he ran for office “driven by the constraints of a reality that did not meet the aspirations of a people who rose against a tyrannical regime.”
During his initial campaign, he said that power “will be in the hands of the people who decide their destiny.” This concept was termed “new revolutionary transition,” which was the basis of his campaign slogan: “The people want.”
This time, Saied’s supporters led the campaign under the direction of his brother, lawyer Nofel Saied, with the slogan: “The people want construction and development.”
Two Governments in Two Years
Saied monitored the political situation in his country and the conflict between parties in the House of Representatives, previously chaired by the leader of the Ennahda Movement, Rached Ghannouchi. After assuming power in 2019, he appointed two prime ministers: Elyes Fakhfakh from February 2020 to September 2020 and Hichem Mechichi from September 2020 to July 25, 2021.
Toward the end of Mechichi’s government, Saied took exceptional measures on July 25, 2021, coinciding with Tunisia’s national holiday. Tunisian cities experienced clashes between protesters and security forces during demonstrations demanding the government’s resignation and the dissolution of Parliament, amid a rapid spread of COVID-19 and deteriorating economic conditions.
In the evening, Saied announced the “suspension of parliamentary powers” for 30 days and the dismissal of Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi.
Dissolution of Parliament
On February 5, 2022, Saied announced the dissolution of the Supreme Judicial Council, and on February 13 of the same month, he issued a decree establishing the “Temporary Supreme Judicial Council,” granting himself the authority to “request the dismissal of any judge who violates their professional duties” and prohibiting judges from striking.
Following a session in which Parliament voted on March 30, 2022, during a virtual general session, a law was passed that annulled all of Saied’s exceptional measures after about eight months of their initiation, after which Saied announced the dissolution of Parliament on the same day.
New Constitution
Saied’s exceptional measures did not stop there. On June 30, 2022, he published a new draft constitution in the official gazette, consisting of 142 articles, despite opposition from experts and political parties. He put it to a referendum on July 25 of the same year, where it gained approval from voters with a rate of 94.60%.
2,458,985 voters participated in the voting process in Tunisia, with a turnout of 27.54% of registered voters. Several Tunisian political forces rejected the results of the referendum on the new constitution, including the “National Salvation Front,” “Ennahda Movement,” and the “National Campaign to Overthrow the Referendum” (a coalition of five leftist parties), arguing that “75% of the population did not participate in the referendum.”
New Parliament
On March 13, 2023, the first session of a new parliament (161 seats) was held, formed following legislative elections that took place in two rounds on December 17, 2022, and January 29, 2023. Ibrahim Bouderbala, a former president of the Bar Association, was elected as the new parliament’s president.
On March 8, 2023, all municipal councils (350 councils) were dissolved, and “general secretaries (municipal employees)” were assigned to manage them under the supervision of governors. This decision was viewed by some as aligning with Saied’s project of “grassroots construction,” which he has long advocated, even before assuming the presidency.
According to Saied, grassroots construction is about rebuilding from the local (regions) to the center, ensuring that all laws and legislations reflect the will of the people in various regions, reaching the center (major cities and the capital).
Political Opposition
Throughout his first presidential term, tensions marked Saied’s relationship with political opposition groups, escalating since February 11, 2023, when Tunisian authorities detained several opposition figures on charges of “conspiracy against state security,” which the “National Salvation Front,” the largest opposition coalition in Tunisia, denies.
The list of those detained since then includes Ghazi Chaouachi (a former minister and secretary-general of the Democratic Current), Issam Chebbi (secretary-general of the Republican Party), Abdul Hamid Jlassi (a former leader in the Ennahda Movement), and Jawhar Ben Mbarek (a constitutional law professor at the University of Tunisia).
On April 17, 2023, Tunisian authorities detained Rached Ghannouchi, the leader of the Ennahda Movement and former president of Parliament, while the private radio station Mosaic reported that the decision to detain Ghannouchi “came to investigate him regarding a leaked video of a conversation he had with leaders of the National Salvation Front,” where he indicated that “excluding political Islam in Tunisia is a project for a civil war.”
Upcoming Challenges
In his new presidential term, President Kais Saied faces the economic crisis exacerbated by climate changes, regional and international tensions, and worsening issues of irregular migration aiming to reach European shores via Tunisia.
Economically, Saied faces challenges in financing major projects he recently announced, such as a medical city in Kairouan (central Tunisia), a high-speed train traversing the country from north to south, and a bridge in Bizerte (north).
Politically, he has lost many who supported his exceptional measures in July 2021, such as the Democratic Current, the Future Tunisia Party, and the Free Constitutional Party, while opposition continues to grow despite the popular support suggested by the results of the presidential elections on October 6.
Controversy in Libya After Dbeibah Forms New Administration for the Islamic Call Society
The interim Prime Minister of Libya’s “National Unity Government,” Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, activated a decision he had made to form a new board for the “World Islamic Call Society,” amidst widespread rejection and debate over the decision, which many see as “contrary to existing legislation” in the country.
Libya has not yet shaken off the negative impact of the central bank conflict when a new dispute erupted on Sunday, centered around a power struggle over “legal authorities.” Observers believe this disagreement further fragments efforts to advance the political process.
In a statement issued early Sunday, the “World Islamic Call Society” expressed its surprise at the government’s decision to form a new board, noting that the decision “either mistakenly or intentionally has no legal basis, as it is subject to the legislative authority of the state according to Libyan law.”
The society explained that “upon learning of the decision from Libyan media and the execution of it, it sought to initiate legal action to challenge it; the House of Representatives and the Presidential Council also took similar steps, but the new board formed by the government insists on disregarding judicial proceedings.”
Imposing the Status Quo
The society discussed how the new board is “continuing its attempts,” which it described as “desperate,” to “impose a status quo and attempt to control the management of the society, contrary to its foundational Law No. 58 of 1972 and Law No. 9 of 2023,” which stipulate that the society is subordinate to its general assembly and the presidency of the House of Representatives exclusively.
Previously, Dbeibah had decided on September 12 to form a new board for the “World Islamic Call Society,” headquartered in Tripoli, comprising a president and six members.
In light of the ongoing political tensions in Libya for over a decade, the current board defended itself, stating it “has maintained its distance from all political conflicts and has preserved the society’s funds, which fundamentally belong to the Libyans.”
Regarding the society’s funds, it emphasized that these resources are “dedicated to advocacy and assisting Muslims worldwide with integrity and sincerity, far removed from the meddling of troublemakers,” reiterating its rejection of what it termed “attempts to drag this venerable institution into the vortex of conflict and control its funds through illicit means, harming its global reputation, especially given contributions from several countries to this esteemed institution.”
Legal Violations
As reactions intensified, Ahmed Abdel Hakim Hamza, head of the National Human Rights Institution in Libya, stated that the decision made by the “Unity” government constitutes a “violation of the laws governing the society’s operations, confirming its subordination to the House of Representatives.”
Libyan politicians are warning against any attempts to tamper with the society’s funds and are calling on regulatory bodies in western Libya to “perform their role in protecting them.” However, Dbeibah’s government insists on its right to change its board of directors, “without any interference related to its savings,” as previously noted in its statements.
Additionally, the government expressed surprise at the “sudden lifting of oversight by the Administrative Control Authority and the Audit Bureau over the expenses and accounts of the Call Society in domestic and foreign banks, without any preventive measures.”
The society argued that “this way facilitates the transfer of any funds from its accounts, making them susceptible to theft and misappropriation, which threatens the institution with bankruptcy,” noting that the Audit Bureau and the oversight authorities previously scrutinized all expenditures and accounts related to the society; “this is work we commend and find surprising to see reversed after the formation of a new board contrary to the law.”
The society also mentioned a previous illegal raid on its headquarters in Tripoli, stating that after this damaging act, there was confusion and fear within the institution among employees regarding the manipulation of the society’s accounts in the absence of concurrent oversight from regulatory bodies.
The Libyan Presidential Council criticized the Unity Government’s decision, deeming it “illegal,” stating: “The process of changing its board should have been carried out by the authorized entity, an action appreciated by the society.” The council urged the Unity Government to reconsider its decision and contribute to protecting the society’s funds and not jeopardizing its reputation.
The “World Islamic Call Society” concluded by reminding that it is an independent private institution by the text of its founding law, with affiliations to international and regional organizations, and that representatives from over 50 Islamic countries participate in its general conference (general assembly), which includes Muslim minorities and has diplomatic representation in over 20 countries.
African Updates
Military Reinforcements and Arrests in Ethiopia’s Amhara Region
In the past two weeks, Ethiopian federal forces have deployed additional reinforcements to the Amhara region, which has been experiencing armed rebellion for over a year. This has also led to a campaign of mass arrests among the local population.
The “Fano” militias, which are popular self-defense groups affiliated with the Amhara ethnic group—Ethiopia’s second-largest ethnicity—took up arms against the central government in April 2023 in a region home to 23 million people.
Ethiopia is home to over 80 ethnic groups, with the Oromo making up 34.4% and the Amhara 27.0%, while Somali and Tigrayan ethnicities represent 6.22% and 6.08%, respectively.
The conflict erupted due to the federal authorities’ desire to disarm the “Fano” forces and regional security forces. In August 2023, the government declared a state of emergency in Amhara, which ended in June.
An anonymous security source stated, “Over the past two weeks, numerous reinforcements from the federal army have been sent, and many government employees suspected of colluding with Fano have been arrested.”
On Tuesday, Amnesty International condemned the “mass arbitrary detentions” in Amhara, noting that hundreds had been arrested, including some academics.
According to Agence France-Presse, these reports cannot be independently verified as authorities restrict access to the region.
Clashes between federal forces and “Fano” have been deadly; on September 17, nine people, mostly civilians, were killed in the town of Debark, located 750 kilometers north of the capital Addis Ababa.
Since more than a year ago, the “Fano” militias, lacking a centralized leadership, have intensified attacks against federal forces and have occasionally taken control of towns in the region.
The “Fano” militias believe they were “betrayed” following Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s peace agreement with the neighboring Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in November 2022, who have long been adversaries of the Amhara ethnic nationalism that claims lands administratively located in Tigray.
During the two years of war in Tigray, the Amhara regional forces supported the federal army.
Observers attribute concerns about the region—Ethiopia’s second-largest after Oromia—to the prevalence of militias and outlaw groups, as well as a significant increase in arms trafficking and smuggling, particularly involving the “Fano,” which has been engaged in armed conflict against the Ethiopian army for a year. The region’s strategic position, bordering Sudan to the west and northwest and Eritrea to the north, adds to these concerns, along with its proximity to four other Ethiopian regions.
“Fano” is an informal military militia spread throughout Ethiopia’s northern Amhara region, which previously fought alongside the federal army and regional special forces against the TPLF from 2020 to 2022.
The term “Fano” has historical roots in the social history of Amhara, historically referring to various meanings, including “the free peasant fighting to defend his homeland, Ethiopia.” The last Emperor of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie, recruited these fighters to confront the Italian invasion of Abyssinia between 1936 and 1941, according to a paper by researcher Abdul Qadir Mohammed Ali.
The group advocates for long-standing grievances of the Amhara people, stemming from decades of systemic marginalization, mass killings, and displacement across different parts of the country, and it operates as a decentralized movement.
The true size of “Fano’s” forces and their territorial control remains unclear, but according to previous data from special forces serving in Amhara, they comprise about 10,000 fighters along with hundreds of other militias active in the region, suggesting an increase in strength since the outbreak of conflict.
In a previous post, “Fano” revealed a military plan outlining its distributions and strategies, dividing its movements in the region into four military axes: Gojjam in the northwest, Gondar in the west near the Sudanese border, Wollo in the northeast adjacent to Tigray and Afar regions, and the Shewa axis adjacent to Oromia and the capital Addis Ababa.
Researcher Mohammed Ali links “Fano’s” movements to regional tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia, with “Fano” seeking to reach the Sudanese border to establish a communication channel with supportive regional powers.
He stated, “The aim of the movement is to exert more pressure on the Ethiopian government, exploiting its preoccupation with developments on the Somali front and the potential escalation of events there, thus diverting all military resources to the Somali border amid this tension.”
Abdul Samad viewed “Fano’s” recent activities in the (Metema – Qalabat) area as an attempt to gain media attention and assert their presence, although it lasted no more than half a day.
Disputes Over Oil-Rich Islands Ignite Conflict Between Gabon and Equatorial Guinea at the International Court
Equatorial Guinea has requested that judges at the International Court of Justice reject Gabon’s claim to several oil-rich islands in the Gulf of Guinea.
The two neighboring African countries, both major oil producers, have asked the UN’s highest court to resolve a dispute centered around the small island of Mbanié, which is less than one kilometer long, off the coast of Gabon.
The conflict has persisted since 1972 when Gabon’s military expelled Equatorial Guinean troops from Mbanié. Since then, Gabon has maintained a military presence on the nearly uninhabited island, which covers only 30 hectares.
In 2016, after years of UN mediation, the two countries signed an agreement that would eventually allow the International Court of Justice to settle the dispute.
Equatorial Guinea bases its claim to the islands on a 1900 agreement that divided French and Spanish colonial assets in West Africa. Meanwhile, Gabon argues that the court should rely on a different agreement from 1974.
Equatorial Guinea contends that the document Gabon presented as evidence of the 1974 agreement is unsigned and not an original.
The hearings will last a week, with Gabon presenting its case on Wednesday. The court is expected to issue its final and binding ruling sometime next year.
Burkina Faso Prepares for Independence in Gold Mining
Ibrahim Traoré, the leader of Burkina Faso’s military council, announced on Saturday that the country plans to revoke mining permits from certain foreign companies and aims to increase its gold production, though he did not specify which permits might be canceled.
In a radio address marking two years since he took power in a coup, he stated, “We know how to extract our gold, and I don’t understand why we would allow multinational companies to come and mine it.”
He added, “In fact, we will revoke mining permits,” but did not provide further details.
Gold is the main export of this West African nation, where long-standing frustration over a persistent security crisis helped bring the military council to power in 2022. Since then, Burkina Faso has severed long-standing ties with Western allies and sought to strengthen relations with Russia.
Mining companies operating in Burkina Faso include Endeavour Mining, listed on the London Stock Exchange, West African Resources based in Australia, Russian Nordgold, and Canadian Orizon Gold Corporation. Mining operations have been complicated by increasing insecurity. Despite the military council’s pledge to contain groups linked to Al-Qaeda and ISIS, Burkina Faso has seen a sharp escalation in deadly attacks in 2023, with more than 8,000 reported deaths according to the US-based Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED).
International Updates
Have Biden’s Failed Policies Escalated the Conflict in the Middle East?
Writer Nicholas Kristof argues that U.S. President Joe Biden has sought to achieve peace in the Middle East but has failed to effectively leverage American influence to compel Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to de-escalate tensions in the region. Kristof claims that Biden has inadvertently fueled the war by continuing to supply Israel with arms used in attacks on Gaza and Lebanon, which could also be employed in a potential conflict with Iran.
While Biden has consistently urged restraint over the past year of conflict, his continued military support for Israel has undermined U.S. standing and power, according to Kristof. He cites Democratic Senator Chris Van Hollen’s remarks: “We see a clear political failure in the Middle East, which I believe is due to the Biden administration’s refusal to effectively utilize its influence to achieve its objectives.”
Van Hollen added, “The problem we face here is a certain pattern of behavior, where Netanyahu ignores the United States and is rewarded with more weapons.” Political scientist Ian Bremmer also commented that Biden’s influence over events is “zero,” especially following Israel’s attacks on Lebanon.
Kristof suggests that Biden hoped the conflict would conclude by the end of 2023, believing a close relationship with Netanyahu was the best way to stop the war. This approach ignores the strategies of his predecessors, as nearly all U.S. presidents since Lyndon Johnson (the 36th president) have either withheld arms from Israel or threatened to do so to pressure their ally in line with U.S. interests.
Kristof deems Biden’s policies, which have extended the war to Lebanon, a “complete failure both politically and morally,” noting that Israelis are no safer than they were a year ago, while Lebanese and Palestinians suffer the consequences of the war. American troops remain at risk in their bases across the Middle East, and the Houthis threaten shipping routes, with no peace in sight and the potential for another war with Iran looming. Despite this, Biden persists in his stance.
The writer notes that the current administration’s policies may diminish the electoral prospects for Democratic candidate and Vice President Kamala Harris, especially if a war with Iran leads to rising oil prices.
Globally, Kristof believes Netanyahu’s arrogance harms U.S. interests. One of Biden’s notable successes has been building alliances with East Asian countries to counter China, but his Middle East policy could jeopardize all those efforts. A survey among citizens in those countries indicates that the Gaza war tops their concerns, and if forced to choose between the U.S. and China, they would prefer China as an ally.
Kristof highlights former Egyptian Foreign Minister Nabil Fahmy’s comment that the prevailing international impression is that Netanyahu disregards U.S. demands, weakening America’s position and potentially alienating its allies. Former UN Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson expressed regret over witnessing the continuous humiliation of the U.S. president and government by Netanyahu.
The article concludes with Kristof questioning what the “kind president who did not want this war” would say if asked by a seven-year-old Lebanese girl who lost 15 family members in an Israeli airstrike, “Why did you supply the bombs that killed my family?”
Concerns Over the Future of Gibraltar and the Falklands After Britain’s Ceding of the Chagos Islands
British Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer has decided to cede sovereignty over the Chagos Islands to the Republic of Mauritius, ending 200 years of British rule over the archipelago located in the Indian Ocean. The Times reported that Starmer announced his decision despite warnings from the United States and concerns from British officials that it could provide China with a strategic spying location.
However, other insiders within the British government denied that the U.S. had secretly warned against the deal. While British ministers and American officials publicly welcomed the agreement, some sources revealed that the U.S. expressed private concerns, “strongly warning” against the move for fear that China might establish listening posts on nearby islands.
The islands, which had been under British colonial rule since 1814, were handed over to Mauritius in a deal that the government claims will protect the future of a U.S. airbase threatened by legal challenges. The Chagos Islands are strategically located in the Indian Ocean and home to Diego Garcia airbase, a key military asset for both Britain and the U.S. in the region.
There are fears that Mauritius may lease some of the islands to China, “which is seeking closer ties” with the nation. The Times noted that there are 47 Chinese initiatives to fund development in Mauritius, and trade between the two countries is on the rise.
British Foreign Secretary David Lammy stated that the announced agreement would secure “a vital military base for the future” through an arrangement allowing Britain to maintain sovereignty over Diego Garcia for another 99 years. The U.K. will pay Mauritius a fee under the agreement, a sum that ministers are pressured to disclose. The government insists that there are guarantees in the agreement to prevent China from gaining a foothold in the Chagos Islands, arguing that Mauritius is not close to Beijing.
U.S. President Joe Biden publicly welcomed the agreement, stating it “ensures the effective operation of the joint facility at Diego Garcia for the next century.”
The Telegraph published reports suggesting that the decision to hand over the archipelago to Mauritius is a “strategic disaster,” with Reform Party leader Nigel Farage claiming that “our American allies will be angry, and Beijing will be pleased.” He stated that the ruling Labour Party is making the world “a more dangerous place” with this step.
The newspaper, known for its pro-conservative stance, commented that the decision appeared rushed, shocking many countries that did not expect the new Labour government to reach an agreement so swiftly. The British Defense Minister confirmed that the decision to relinquish the archipelago “will enhance our role in protecting global security and close any possibility of using the Indian Ocean as a dangerous irregular migration route to the U.K., while also ensuring our long-standing relationship with Mauritius, a close Commonwealth partner.”
In another report, the Telegraph noted that Starmer raised concerns about the future of Gibraltar, which enjoys self-governance and is a British crown territory, and the Falkland Islands, after the decision regarding the Chagos Islands. According to the newspaper, the archipelago will fall under the jurisdiction of Mauritius despite concerns about its ties to China, which signed an unprecedented trade agreement with Mauritius in 2021.
Meanwhile, Argentina pledged on Thursday to regain “full sovereignty” over the Falkland Islands following the decision regarding the Chagos Islands. Foreign Minister Diana Mondino welcomed the decision, considering it a step towards ending “outdated practices.” She promised to take “concrete actions” to ensure the transfer of the Falkland Islands—an archipelago controlled by Britain and referred to by Argentina as Malvinas.
Water Scarcity in the Middle East and Africa Increases Chances of New Wars and Conflicts
A U.S. intelligence center warned that water scarcity threatens to become a weapon and a driver of conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa.
Water Scarcity in the Middle East and Africa Increases Chances of New Wars and Conflicts
In its assessment of the water situation in the region, the American intelligence center Stratfor warns that worsening water scarcity, exacerbated by years of mismanagement, security vacuums, and population growth, is turning water into an increasingly contested resource. This escalation heightens the risk of social unrest, violence from non-state armed groups, and conflict between nations.
Stratfor states that “water stress” in the Middle East and North Africa has become a more acute threat to the stability of individual countries and the region as a whole, amid an ongoing struggle for this vital and dwindling resource. The center blames the region’s countries for decades of poor management of their water resources, which has intensified water shortages in a climate characterized by heat and dryness.
Compounding this issue is the rapid population growth in many countries, which has increased demand for limited freshwater resources. Against this backdrop, access to water supplies has become a driver of conflict among states and non-state actors in the region, as well as a catalyst for social unrest.
Stratfor attributes water stress to the disparity between the water resources of countries and their demand for it. In severely water-scarce nations like those in the Middle East and North Africa, nearly all available water resources are utilized, making these countries vulnerable to water shortages due to any changes in supply or demand.
Despite the scarcity in the region, the fragility of water situations varies from country to country. Some nations benefit from rivers flowing within their territories, giving them an advantage over those lacking access to such surface water systems.
According to a report from the World Resources Institute in August 2023, countries most affected by water stress include Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and Lebanon, primarily due to inadequate supplies for domestic, agricultural, and industrial use. The report details that the Middle East and North Africa are the regions experiencing the highest levels of water stress, with over 83% of the population impacted by excessive water use.
The American center warns that countries with surplus water will use this vital resource as a “coercive tool” to deter potential hostilities against them should conflicts arise, threatening the stability of water-scarce nations.
As water availability continues to decline amid increasing demand for agricultural, industrial, and domestic use, countries facing water shortages are likely to seek agreements with those that have more abundant water supplies.
However, the center notes that geographical, infrastructural, and financial constraints will limit many countries’ abilities to negotiate such agreements. Additionally, given the frequent diplomatic conflicts or outright disputes among countries in the Middle East and North Africa, “water coercion” will increasingly serve as a strategic tool to exert power and influence over water-scarce nations.
For naturally water-rich countries like Turkey or those with technological capabilities (like Israel for desalination), this strategy could involve controlling water flow and access, often exacerbating tensions and conflicts in an already unstable region.
The center cites the 2021 water agreement between Israel and Jordan as an example, where Jordan receives water from Israel in exchange for providing energy to Tel Aviv. While this agreement facilitates cooperation, it reveals power imbalances, with Israel controlling water sources, putting Jordan at risk during drought periods.
Another example of how water resources influence inter-state relations is the conflict between Turkey and Iraq and Syria. Stratfor sees Turkey’s control over the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, impacting downstream countries (Iraq and Syria), as a recent illustration of using water as a “coercive tool.”
In countries like Iran, Iraq, Algeria, and Bahrain, inadequate water management has already triggered episodes of public unrest, highlighting the potential severity of this issue in the coming years.
Weak governance structures across the region exacerbate these problems, as corruption, inefficiency, and insufficient investment in water infrastructure hinder effective management of this resource.
In Egypt, the report adds, government policies prioritizing water-intensive crops like rice have strained the limited water supplies from the Nile, amidst growing concerns about Ethiopia’s filling of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.
The center explains that water shortages in Algeria and Iran have sparked waves of public protests, noting that increasing water scarcity in the region is likely to create an environment where non-state armed groups could seize control of vital water resources to gain influence.
